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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOHN MCHUGH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
1
 • — 
CaseNo.20090767-CA 
— 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3) of the Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD ofr REVIEW 
1. The trial court erred when it denied the Defendant's oral Motion to Dismiss or Declare a 
Mistrial when Defendant's due process rights were violated as a result of the State's 
failure to provide subpoenaed, exculpatory evidence? 
2. The trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion toi dismiss or declare mistrial 
when the state failed to comply with Rule 16(a)(1) of the tJtah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure which requires the disclosure of recorded statements 
3. Defendant's counsel was ineffective when defense counsel failed to move for 
enforcement of defendant's discovery subpoena until afteij the jury trial witnesses had 
concluded their testimony, but prior to final oral arguments. 
1 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the 
following material or information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the 
guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be made 
available to the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of 
charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a continuing duty to 
make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose to the prosecutor 
such information as required by statute relating to alibi or insanity and any other item of evidence 
which the court determines on good cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in 
order for the prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days 
before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may make disclosure by 
notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected, tested or copied at 
specified reasonable times and places. The prosecutor or defense may impose reasonable 
limitations on the further dissemination of sensitive information otherwise subject to discovery to 
prevent improper use of the information or to protect victims and witnesses from harassment, 
abuse, or undue invasion of privacy, including limitations on the further dissemination of 
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videotaped interviews, photographs, or psychological or medical reports. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or inspection be 
denied, restricted, or deferred, that limitations on the further dissemination of discovery be 
modified or make such other order as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may 
permit the party to make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to 
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief following such an ex 
parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be sealed and preserved in the records 
of the court to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court 
that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit the 
discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not 
disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime;| 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and other bodily materials 
which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of the alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, 
reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall be given to the accused and his 
counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to comply with the requirements of this rule, unless 
relieved by order of the court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of 
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pre-trial release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration 
along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and shall be subject to such further 
sanctions as the court should deem appropriate. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
John McHugh appeals from a jury trial based on the State's failure to provide exculpatory 
evidence in violation of the "Brady Rule ", Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
and for ineffective assistance of counsel 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court 
On June 24, 2009, after a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of making a Terroristic 
Threat, a Second Degree Felony. 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. On March 26, 2008, a blocked phone call was received by a secretary at the Wasatch 
County School District, Lori Magnusson, where a person stated to her, "The bomb will go 
off at 2:00". (June 23-24, 2008, Official Trans., page 103-104). 
2. Defendant was charged with making a Terroristic Threat (a second degree felony), on 
March 26, 2008. Information, April 2, 2008. 
3. A jury trial was held June 23 and June 24, 2009. (June 23-24, 2008, Official Trans., cover 
page). 
4. Lori Magnusson, was unable to identify the Defendant as the caller or even to recognize 
his voice. (June 23-24, 2008, Official Trans., page 109, line 8-17). 
5. Sergeant Bradley never found any evidence on the Defendants's subpoenaed phone 
records that the Defendant's phone had called the Wasatch County School District or that 
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the phone used the star 67 feature to block the number. (June 23-24, 2008, Official 
Trans., page 145-146). 
6. Prior to trial Defendant submitted a subpoena duces tecum for the jail recordings 
specifically, and any other electronic recordings of the Defendant, John McHugh. (June 
23-24, 2008, Official Trans., page 314, line 6-8). 
7. Defendant's trial counsel moved the court for "some sanation if not dismissal, [then] 
perhaps a mistrial" for plaintiff not providing the requested jail telephone recordings that 
would contain a "statement by Tammy Baker on the phone that would have confirmed 
our theory." (June 23-24, 2008, Official Trans., page 314, line 15-24). 
8. This was based on Defendant having issued "a subpoena duces tecum for the jail 
recordings and any recordings, electronic recordings of John McHugh while he was in 
jail. Deputy Hales verifie[d] that Mr. McHugh did make phone calls and that those phone 
calls would have been recorded as a matter of course. However, those phone call 
recordings were never produced to [Defendant's counsel]." (June 23-24, 2008, Official 
Trans., page 314, line 6-12). 
9. The judge made it clear to Defendant's trial counsel, "If the defendant wanted discovery, 
submit your discovery request. If you don't get the information you've asked for, file you 
[sic] bill of particulars and I go over them and I'm one that 99 9/10 of the time will tell 
the State, provide what's been asked for, if you've got anything relating to it, provide it." 
(June 23-24, 2008, Official Trans., page 315, line 9-14). 
10. The court denied Defendant's oral motion. (June 23-24, 2008, Official Trans., page 315, 
line 25; page 316, line 1-2). 
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11. Defendant was found guilty for making a Terroristic Threat on June 24, 2009. (June 23-
24, 2008, Official Trans., page 347, line 2-3). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Declare 
Mistrial when properly subpoenaed recordings of the defendant were never provided to the 
Defendant, thus violating his right to due process. Additionally, the state's withholding of the 
subpoenaed recordings is a violation of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which require the 
prosecutor to disclose to the defense, upon request, relevant written or recorded statements of the 
defendant. Trial counsel for the Defendant failed to secure these recordings. Under an objective 
standard or reasonableness, any attorney would have done something more to follow up with the 
subpoena duces tecum, whether that be filing a Bill of Particulars, or a Motion in Limine before 
the trial got underway, let alone finished. The defendant was facing charges of making a 
Terroristic Threat. The content of the recorded calls made by him to the outside worlds would be 
of great importance to law enforcement. These recordings were significant pieces of evidence, 
and became more significant when the calls were to the key prosecution witness. The 
subpoenaed recordings would have shown that the state's key witness, Tammy Marie Baker, had 
given contradictory statements prior to her testimony at trial. Her telephone statements with the 
accused while in jail, and recorded, would disclose that she was sorry for bringing so much 
trouble to the accused as she knew it was not him that had made the call to the Wasatch County 
School District, and it was likely that it was some of the many children who congregate at her 
home. She also stated she made up the fact the accused had made an admission to her. She 
further stated that the reason she did it was because she was angry with the accused over their 
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breakup. Further she stated that she intended to tell the police what she had done and why, and 
she would make a full retraction of her original evidence. Had the recordings been produced the 
Defendant would have had the opportunity cross-examine her over these admissions and the jury 
could decide her credibility and reliability as a witness. The State's case was tenuous at best; 
revealing the deception of the State's key witness was critical to the defendant and would likely 
have changed the outcome of the proceedings. The subpoenaed recordings would very likely 
have shown that the State's case was tenuous at best, revealing the deception of the State's key 
witness, and very likely change the outcome of the proceeding. Based upon the above, this court 
should reverse the trial courts ruling when the trial court denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
the Case or Declare a Mistrial for the State's refusal to provide exculpatory evidence and further 
this Court should dismiss this case due to defense counsel's ineffective assistance. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S ORAL 
MOTION TO DISMISS OR DECLARE A MISTRIAL WHEN DEFENDANT'S DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED AS A RESULT OF THE STATE'S FAILURE 
TO PROVIDE SUBPOENAED, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE. 
A. Relevant Law 
This Court should reverse the trial court's ruling when it refused to dismiss the State's 
case because the Defendant was denied due process. "Suppression of evidence favorable to the 
accused is itself sufficient to amount to a denial of due process." Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 
at 820. The law has long held "that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused, upon request, violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady v. Maryland, 
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373 U.S. 83, at 87. This case gave rise to the "Brady claim." A Brady claim can be made when 
"the government failed to accede to a defense request for disclosure of some specific kind." 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, at 103-104. 
The duty to disclose also includes a "duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the 
others acting on the government's behalf." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419. This duty, through 
the prosecutor, is extended to any party acting on the government's behalf. Therefore, the 
prosecutor himself need not have actual knowledge of the potentially exculpatory evidence. In 
defending the implications of this rule, the Wlntley court stated: 
The state . . . would prefer an even more lenient rule. It pleads that some of 
the favorable evidence in issue here was not disclosed even to the prosecutor until 
after trial, and it suggested . . . that it should not be held accountable under Bagley 
and Brady for evidence known only to police investigators and not to the 
prosecutor. To accommodate the State in this manner would, however, amount to 
a serious change of course from the Brady line of cases. In the State's favor it may 
be said that no one doubts that police investigators sometimes fail to inform a 
prosecutor of all they know. But neither is there any serious doubt that 
"procedures and regulations can be established to carry [the prosecutor's] burden 
and to insure communication of all relevant information on each case to every 
lawyer who deals with it." Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,154 (1972). 
Since, then, the prosecutor has the means to discharge the government's Brady 
responsibility if he will, any argument for excusing a prosecutor from disclosing 
what he does not happen to know about boils down to a plea to substitute the 
police for the prosecutor, and even for the courts themselves, as the final arbiters 
of the government's obligation to ensure fair trials. 
M a t 438. 
In Kyles v. Whitley, the defendant was accused and convicted of first degree murder and 
sentenced to death. Id. "Because the State withheld evidence, its case was much stronger, and 
the defense case much weaker, than the full facts would have suggests." Id Ultimately, the 
Court reversed and remanded the court of appeals affirmation of the conviction. 
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This Court should reverse the trial court's ruling and dishiiss the State's case because, as 
in Kyles v. Whitley, the State withheld evidence, making its case much stronger, and substantially 
weakening the Defendant's case. The Defendant's case sought ijo show Casey Mair, Brandy 
Baker, and in particular, Tammy Baker lied about the Defendants supposed confession. This 
alleged confession was the crux of the State's argument. Without the confession, there was no 
case. 
During this trial, Defense counsel was able to show Lori Magnusson, was not able to 
identify the Defendant as the caller and failed to recognize his vcjice earlier. (June 23-24, 2008, 
Official Trans., page 109, line 8-17.) Defense counsel also showed Sergeant Bradley never 
found, in the phone records of the Defendant's phone that the Defendant's phone had called the 
school, or had even used the star 67 feature. (June 23-24, 2008, Official Trans., page 145-146). 
The State's only piece of evidence to connect the Defendant with the phone call to 
Wasatch County School District was Tammy Baker's testimony 6f the Defendant's confession. 
Knowing this, Defendant sought the recordings of the telephone Conversations the Defendant had 
with Tammy Baker while he was in jail. Officer Jeremy Hales w^s asked "would (phone calls 
from John McHugh that left the jail to Tammy Baker or others) hkve been recorded?" (June 23-
24, 2008, Official Trans., page 305, line 14-15). To which Officer Jeremy Hales answered 
"those phone calls are all recorded that leave the jail." Id. at 22-23. With these recordings, the 
Defense would have been able to show the clear contradictions of Tammy Baker's testimony. 
The State may respond to this argument that Brady should not be applied because the 
prosecutor apparently did not hear the recordings, and seems to h$ve been unaware of their 
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existence. This argument fails however when precedent law is considered. The duty to disclose 
also includes a "duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the 
government's behalf." Kylesv. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419. This duty, through the prosecutor, is 
extended to any party acting on the government's behalf. Therefore, the prosecutor himself need 
not have actual knowledge of the potentially exculpatory evidence. 
The prosecutor and the jail were put on notice of the potentially exculpatory evidence by 
the Defendant's subpoena duces tecum for the jail recordings specifically, and any other 
electronic recordings of the Defendant. Id. at 314 at 6-8. Therefore, while the prosecutor and 
government may have not had actual knowledge of what was contained in the recordings, they 
had been put on notice, thereby giving them constructive knowledge. Since the jail had the 
recording in question, and obviously the jail system is a government agent, there was a duty to 
disclose. This duty is even more apparent after the subpoena duces tecum was served to provide 
these recordings. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS OR DECLARE MISTRIAL WHEN THE STATE FAILED TO COMPLY 
WITH RULE 16(A)(1) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
WHICH REQUIRES THE DISCLOSURE OF RECORDED STATEMENTS 
A. Relevant Law 
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure require the prosecutor to disclose to the defense upon 
request, relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or information of which he has 
knowledge. Rule 16. If the prosecutor, and by extension, the government, failed in doing so, it 
would "cast the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with 
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standards of justice, even though . . . his action [are] not "the result of guile."" Brady v. State, 
226 Md. 422 at 427, 174 A.2d 167 at 169 (1961). 
Under Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the State was required to 
disclose all the recorded statements of the Defendant. While the state may argue that telephonic 
recordings are not the type of "statements" referred to in Rule 16, the rule specifies that upon 
request, "relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant" must be disclosed to the 
Defendant. In this case, because the Defendant served a subpoena duces tecum specifically for 
the Defendant's jail recordings, and any other electronic recordings, the recordings of the 
telephonic statements became relevant; regardless as to whether or not the same had been 
reviewed. (June 23-24, 2008, Official Trans., page 314, line 6-8). The State never provided these 
recordings. Id. at 304,16-20. Since the State never provided the Requested recordings, the court 
should have sanctioned the prosecution by granting the Defendarit's motion to dismiss or at least 
declare mistrial. 
III. DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE WH^N DEFENSE COUNSEL 
FAILED TO MOVE FOR ENFORCEMENT OF DEFENDANT'S DISCOVERY 
SUBPOENA UNTIL AFTER THE JURY TRIAL WITNESSES HAD CONCLUDED 
THEIR TESTIMONY, BUT PRIOR TO FINAL ORAL ARGUMENTS. 
A. Relevant Law 
"In order to bring a successful ineffective assistance of cotmsel claim pursuant to the 
Sixth Amendment, a defendant must show [1] that trial counsel's performance was deficient in 
that it 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,' and [^ ] that the deficient performance 
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prejudiced the outcome of the trial." State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 822 (Utah App. 1994), 
quoting State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
Under the first requirement, "[t]he proper standard forjudging attorney performance is 
that of reasonably effective assistance, considering all the circumstances." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669. "When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness 
of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. While no comprehensive list of what makes counsel 
ineffective exists, the guide to be used is "its purpose - to ensure a fair trial." Id. at 686. The 
benchmark forjudging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result. Id. 
The proper standard with regard to the showing of prejudice, "requires the defendant to 
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different." Id. "A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. 
Trial counsel in Defendant's case was ineffective because they failed to gather key 
evidence which they were aware of, evidence that very likely would have changed the outcome 
of the trial. In this case, Defendant's trial counsel moved the court for "some sanction if not 
dismissal, [then] perhaps a mistrial." (June 23-24, 2008, Official Trans., page 314, line 23-24). 
This was based on Defendant having issued "a subpeona duces teum for the jail recordings and 
any recordings, electronic recordings of John McHugh while he was in jail. Deputy Hales 
verifiefd] that Mr. McHugh did make phone calls and that those phone calls would have been 
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recorded as a matter of course. However, those phone call recordings were never produced to 
[Defendant's counsel]." Id .at 314,6-12. 
The judge denied the request to impose sanctions, grant ^ mistrial or declare mistrial. Id. 
at 315, 25; 316, 1-2. However, the trial court made it clear to Defendant's trial counsel of this 
error by stating, "If the defendant wanted discovery, submit youij discovery request. If you don't 
get the information you've asked for, file you [sic] bill of particulars and I go over them and I'm 
one that 99 9/10 of the time will tell the State, provide what's be^n asked for, if you've got 
anything relating to it, provide it." Id. at 315, 9-14. 
In this matter, Defense counsel failed to take any sort of fyasic maneuvers in obtaining 
critical recordings. As the judge stated, "you can't come in after (everybody is finished and make 
the request that somehow you should have been given things that! you weren't even in light of the 
fact that you filed a subpoena. Since you filed a subpoena, he's your witness, you need to go 
over and talk to him about what he's got. If there became a problem with it, then it should have 
been brought to the attention of the Court." Id. at 315, 18-24. Or in short, "it's too late." Id. By 
the language of the judge's response, and the basic level of instrubtion contained therein, this 
Court can be assured defense counsel fell below fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. 
Had Defense Counsel obtained the subpoenaed recording^, there is "reasonable 
probability" that the result of the proceeding would have been different. "A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in ihe outcome." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686. Given Tammy Baker's testimony included an alleged 
confession from the Defendant, her testimony was of paramount importance to the State's case. 
There is a very likely possibility the recorded conversations betwden John McHugh and Tammy 
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Baker, while he was in jail, would include a statement by Ms. Baker that would have confirmed 
the Defendant's position. (June 23-24, 2008, Official Trans., page 314, line 15-16). While 
counsel did manage to build a case, showing Tammy Baker's alternative agenda, it fell short 
because of the failure to gather this crucial evidence. The lack of showing for such telling 
evidence gives rise to a probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different 
but for this lacking, surely confidence in the outcome has been undermined. Therefore, this 
Court should reverse the trial court's ruling due to ineffective counsel's failure to enforce the 
Defendant's subpoena. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred by denying the defendant's right to due process by denying 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Declare Mistrial and erred in failing to enforce Rule 16 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The failure to gather key evidence, and ensure the matter was 
addressed in a timely manner is itself clear evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Therefore, in order to ensure due process for the defendant, to ensure the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure are properly enforced, and to ensure the Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
effective counsel is protected, this Court should dismiss the State's Case. 
Respectfully submitted this (fa day of A i a^: 
a iA> 
_,2010. 
i 
SNA~M. B^CEMYI 
Counsel for Appellant^6hn McHugh 
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would you please? Thank you. 
LORI MAGNUSSON 
having been first duly sworn, testifie 
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ma'am. 
upon h e r o a t h as f o l l o w s : 
THE COURT: Have a s e a t r i g h t ove r h e r e p l e a s e 
Thank you. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. LAKE: 
Q 
A 
Could you p l e a s e s t a t e your name and o c c u p a t i o n ? 
Lor i Magnusson, s e c r e t a r y a t t h e Wasatch School 
D i s t r i c t . 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
come in 
And how l o n g have you h e l d t h a t p o s i t i o n ? 
About f o u r y e a r s . 
What a r e some of your r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ? 
To answer t h e phones and t o g r e e t p e o p l e a s t h e y 
t h e door a n d , you know, do some f i l e s and kind of 
wha teve r t h e s u p e r v i s o r s ask me t o d o . 
Q 
of 2008 : 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
What i s 
A 
And were you working i n t h a t c a p a c i t y on March 2 6 
I was. 
Did you r e c e i v e any c o n c e r n i n g c a l l t h a t day? 
Yes, I d i d . 
And what phone number d i d you r e c e i v e t h a t c a l l or. 
your number? 
I u s u a l l y look a t t h e phone b e f o r e I p i c k i t up an 
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that one - oh, our phone number is 654-0280. There are 
probably, I don't know, a hundred lines that come into that 
district office though. 
Q But that's the number you received the call on, 
correct? 
Yes. 
Approximately what time did this concerning call 
A 
Q 
come in? 
A 
12:30. 
Q 
A 
Somewhere between 12:00, probably, and 12:20, 
And how do you have a recollection of the time? 
I remember that it was before lunch and, you know, 
you start getting hungry and it's close to lunchtime and it 
was before that so... 
Q All right. And if you would, as precisely as you 
can, state for the jury what that caller said to you. 
A The caller said, "The bomb will go off at 2:00." 
And you know, I tried to get a response from that by saying 
excuse me, like, to kind of get him to talk to me or 
something and there was no response, they were gone. I could 
tell by the phone the call had cut off and it was gone. 
Q Approximately how long was the call? 
A Seconds. 
Q And were you able to tell whether at was a male or 
female caller? 
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Q Okay, and you previously testified to your 
recollection that voice didn't have an accent? 
A Right. 
Q So you d i d n ' t detect any kind of a Southern accent 
a Louisiana accent in that voice? 
A No. 
Q Okay. It's also true that when you were 
interviewed by the law enforcement officers that they played 
some examples of John McHugh's voice for you to listen to; i 
that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And you listened to John McHugh's voice on a 
recording? 
A Yes. 
Q And it's also true that you were not able to 
identify Mr. McHugh's voice as the voice on that phone? 
A That's correct. 
Q And that's still your testimony today? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. Now, you state that first you thought 
it was a prank but you thought better to follow through, so 
went to your supervisor. 
A I knew you had to follow through. It was a call t 
the school district. It impacted everyone. 
Q And this was to the school districts main, central 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Correct. 
And he handed you his phone. 
He had a phone with him when he was arrested. 
And you used that phone to - did you use that phone 
to look up whether a call had been made from that phone on j 
March 26 
A 
they didn 
Q 
showed on 
or did you use his records from Nextel? 
I actually checked the call logs on the phone but 
't go back far enough. 
So there was no call found on the actual phone that 
March 26 at around 12:07 p.m. that he called the 
school district? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
didn't sh 
A 
Q 
Correct, 
Or that that phone called the school district. 
On the phone, no. 
Regardless of who may have used it, that phone 
ow any record of it. 
No. 
It also didn't show whether somebody punched in 
star 67 first before dialing the number? 
A 
show that 
Q 
obtained 
I don't know without - I don't know that it would 
anyway but... 
Let me ask you this, what about the records you 
from Nextel? Did they show that star 67 was dialed 
first before the school district number? 
A I don't believe they showed that information. 
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Q That's jumping ahead a little bit. Ultimately what 
you did though is you made some phone calls to numbers that 
were in Mr. McHugh's telephone records for calls placed from 
that phone number immediately before and immediately after 
that 12:07 call to the school district. 
A Yes. 
Q And you say half hour to an hour before or half 
hour or to an hour afterwards. 
A Yes. 
Q But not many hours before or many hours afterward. 
A No. But some of them were the same. 
Q So from March 26 until April 1, 2008, that 5-day 
period, did you look at all of the calls from Mr. McHugh's 
phone number that were made during that time period? 
A No. 
Q Did you look at any of the calls that were made 
from before March 26 other than the one or two immediately 
before the 12:07 call? 
A No, probably not with any scrutiny. 
Q So you never checked his phone or his phone records 
to see if that school district phone number had ever been 
called before? 
A Not that I recall. 
Q Do you have any evidence that Mr. McHugh's phone, 
phone number, phone account shows that that phone number or 
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Q Have you seen those records? 
A I have. 
Q Were you aware of those visits or visit? 
A I was. 
Q Was that visit recorded electronically in any 
fashjion? 
h No, it was not. 
Q Was it listened into in any fashion by an officer? 
ft I do not believe it was. 
2 So you're - you can confirm then that Wasatch 
Countjy Sheriff s Office can confirm through its records that 
TaroW Baker visited John McHugh during that time period? 
A Yes. 
p Phone calls from John McHugh that left the jail to 
TamrrJ Baker or others? Were there some? 
A I don't know, sir. 
b Are there any records of that? 
A I did not search that. 
Q Do you have any knowledge of those phone calls? 
A Personally I do not have knowledge of those. 
6 Would those phone calls have been recorded? 
A Those phone calls are all recorded that leave the 
jail. 
Q. So somebody from the sheriff s office would have 
listened to those recordings? 
1 MR. FLINT: There is one other thing I would like 
2 to put on the record though. 
3 THE COURT: You may. 
4 MR. FLINT: When Deputy Hales testified as the 
5 representative of the Wasatch County Sheriffs Office, I did 
6 ask him about jail records. We did issue a subpoena duces 
7 tecum for the jail records and any recordings, electronic 
8 recordings of John McHugh while he was in jail. Deputy Hales 
9 verifies that Mr. McHugh did make phone calls and that those 
10 phone calls would have been recorded as a matter of course. 
11 However, those phone call recordings were never produced to 
12 us. Although Deputy Hales states he never listened to them, 
13 they were never provided to us. There's a possibility that 
14 they could have contained exculpatory information such as 
15 what we had hoped for would be a statement by Tammy Baker on 
16 the phone that would have confirmed our theory. Having not 
17 received those records despite the subpoena being duly served 
18 on them and Deputy Hales being here as the representative for 
19 the sheriff's office and not producing those records, our 
20 objection would be that the State has failed, and the 
21 ] sheriff's office in particular has failed to provide us with 
22 | potentially exculpatory evidence; therefore creating a 
23 | prejudice that should result in some sanction if not 
24 | dismissal, perhaps a mistrial. But that's our motion. 
25 | MS. LAKE: Your Honor, I believe it's Rule 16 of 
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the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding the 
applicability of discovery. In that rule what defense 
counsel has indicated is not contained within the 
requirements of that rule and so for that reason I would 
objectf to the defendant's objection. 
THE COURT: All right. Considering both responses 
from dounsel, it's the ruling of the Court discovery and 
requests for information, that time for that is long past 
after both sides have rested in the case. If the defendant 
wanted discovery, submit your discovery request. If you 
don't get the information you've asked for, file you bill of 
particulars and I go over them and I'm one that 99 9/10 of 
the time will tell the State, provide what's been asked for, 
if you've got anything relating to it, provide it. There's 
no aces up sleeves and there's nothing held when you try 
cases before me and I've never liked that notion. 
But the request now before the Court I think is 
moot, it's too late. You can't come in after everybody is 
finished and make the request that somehow you should have 
been given things that you weren't even in light of the fact 
that you filed a subpoena. Since you filed a subpoena, he's 
your witness, you need to go over and talk to him about what 
he's got. If there became a problem with it, then it should 
have been brought to the attention of the Court. Therefore, 
I'm denying the request from the defendant to impose 
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1 I sanctions, denying the request from the defendant to grant a 
2 J mistrial or am I going to dismiss the case. The case will go 
3 to the jury. It's a fact situation case and each of you will 
4 have an opportunity to argue your case to the jury and 
5 they'll make the decision. 
6 I will address one other issue with counsel. I 
7 want to make sure that I don't have to impose myself during 
8 closing argument and this observation I make to defense 
9 counsel, there can be no representation to the jury that the 
10 defendant's testified in any fashion. He hasn't testified, 
11 he's not testified, he's not taken the stand. The fact that 
12 you played a blurb from him on interrogation cannot be used 
13 as somehow a substitute for him testifying. I thought about 
14 that when the request was made to play the little ditty and 
15 decided what I'd do depending on what happened with the case 
16 and so Mr. Flint is well aware of how the rules operate. So 
17 that's all I'm going to say. 
18 MR. FLINT: Judge, the only thing we're going to 
19 say in closing argument is we'll reread the portion of 
20 Instruction 6, as you listen, keep in mind the defendant has 
21 answered the charge by saying not guilty. That's the only 
22 (inaudible) we'll make. 
23 THE COURT: And you're certainly welcome to do 
24 that. 
25 MR. FLINT: And we may also argue that he has a 
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high pitched, nasally, southern accent voice that was never 
identified but we won't allude to the recording that was 
heard, 
THE COURT: I don't know that you can make that 
representation because there's no evidence. All you can do 
is argue the evidence. You don't have any evidence about 
the nature and sound of his voice. 
MR. FLINT: It'll have to be what Lori Magnusson 
testified to and nothing else then. 
THE COURT: It was a neutral voice, low, male, 
neutral voice. 
MR. FLINT: And did not have an accent. 
THE COURT: And did not have an accent. 
MR. FLINT: We'll limit it exactly to that. 
THE COURT: Just a minute. Yeah, that's their 
testimony. 
MR. FLINT: And that she was allowed to hear 
examples of John McHugh's voice and could not identify that 
voice as the voice she heard. 
THE COURT: You may do that because that's what 
the evidence -
MR. GRIMES: Nothing further. That's a promise. 
THE COURT: Correct. Okay. I'll take your word. 
MR. FLINT: He's the one giving the closing so will 
you promise to? 
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